In Smit v. Charles Schwab & Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25589 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that standing was lacking to pursue investor action under the UCL based on the fact “Plaintiff gained money by her investment in the Fund”:
Given the UCL standing principles set forth in Kwikset, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged economic loss resulting from the alleged unlawful activity. Plaintiff alleges that Fund share values declined when the Fund deviated from its fundamental investment objective without first holding a shareholder vote. Even if Plaintiff gained money through dividends, as defendants claim, Plaintiff's argument is that she would have gained more if the Fund had not deviated from its investment objective. This alleged loss satisfies the "identifiable trifle" of economic harm required for standing under the UCL. Therefore, defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of a lack of standing is DENIED.See Smit, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25589, at 26-27.
In Shaw v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19875 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that standing was lacking in deceptive home loan modification action based on the fact “the payments Plaintiff made pursuant to the terms of the alleged loan modification were due under the original note anyway”:
Assuming there was a loan modification agreement, Plaintiff was economically injured because he made the monthly payments to obtain, among other things, BAC's forbearance with respect to foreclosure proceedings. BAC may not have been under any duty to modify the original note. But if BAC agreed to a loan modification, Plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the bargain.
BAC's argument that Plaintiff must identify a loss of money that is eligible for restitution has been rejected by the California Supreme Court. In Kwikset, the California Supreme Court explained that nothing in the text or history of Proposition 64 suggests that voters intended for standing under § 17204 to be dependent on eligibility for restitution under § 17203. 51 Cal. 4th 310, Id. at *14. "Accordingly, we hold ineligibility for restitution is not a basis for denying standing under section 17204 and disapprove those cases that have concluded otherwise." 51 Cal. 4th 310, Id. at *15.
Even if Plaintiff is not eligible for restitution, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled economic injury and has standing to pursue a UCL claim.  Therefore, BAC's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.Shaw, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19875, at 5-8.
In Bottoni v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18874 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011), which challenged a student loan lender’s practice of imposing liquidated damages, the court rejected defendant’s argument that standing was lacking “based on the attempts to collect the fees and the alleged collection practices”:
[T]he court in Kwikset held "ineligibility for restitution is not a basis for denying standing under section 17204" and disapproved of those cases — including Buckland — that concluded otherwise. Id. Accordingly, the court rejects Sallie Mae's argument that Plaintiffs must show losses of money or property eligible for restitution.See Bottoni, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18874, at 3-4, 37-38.
In Hamana v. Kholi, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26944, 10-11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2011), the court rejected defendant’s argument that standing was lacking “because Plaintiff has received more money in principal than he has paid in allegedly unlawful interest”:
The California Supreme Court in Kwikset recently explained that showing loss of money or property requires a plaintiff to demonstrate "some form of economic injury" and that there are "innumerable ways in which economic injury from unfair competition may be shown." Id. at 323. For example, a plaintiff who has been "deprived of money or property to which he or she has a cognizable claim" demonstrates economic injury. Id.
Plaintiff's section 17200 claims meet this broad standard. Plaintiff has alleged the payment of interest on loans at usurious rates, and Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff's usury claims. California law allows under certain circumstances treble recovery of such interest payments without reference to whether the interest payments made exceeded principal received. See Cal.Civ.Code § 1916-3.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's usury cause of action contains facts that show a deprivation of money to which Plaintiff has a cognizable claim, independent of the fact that Plaintiff may have retained more money in principal than he paid in wrongful interest. Thus, Plaintiff has standing under § 17204, and Defendants' motions to dismiss the eighth cause of action are DENIED.See Hamana, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26944, at 10-11.